I am in no way qualified or comfortable speaking about events in Tunisia and Egypt (someone who is both). I’ve been watching from a distance, and have been inundated by the pundits discussing popular uprisings and the potential for democracy in the region. And again, as I have in the past, I’ve found the overwhelmingly positive view of the rise of democracy striking. I’ll add my personal feelings here that, normatively, I am in favor of self-determination and the rights of citizens to participate in their government, and, with the proper framework (protection of minority rights, etc), democracy is a positive thing. Yet from the perspective of a state’s self-interest, democracy in another state can be counter to their interests and certainly a threat to the stability of the system. This idea is not something intuitive or very palatable to most in the US. Tumult in the Arab world brought this to mind, but I explore it below in relation to China, the rise of which has been the topic of recent posts by Ezra Klein and the Daily Dish, among others.*
We all know China is rising, and undoubtedly the rapid economic, military, and geopolitical growth of that country is something that the US (and other Western countries) must manage carefully. So far, things have been peaceful, and relations between the current hegemon and the country that might very well become a great power challenger, while at times strained, have generally been at least civil. China has chosen the “peaceful rise” route, and has pursued, for the most part, a “smile strategy” (PDF) in an attempt to reassure regional rivals. Granted, not everyone is so sanguine about the persistence of this “peaceful rise.” Realists like old reliable Mearsheimer see an era of great power competition (PDF) for hegemony in Asia as a forgone conclusion, an inevitable consequence of China’s quest for security as its “power” grows. Tension between the US and China seems to be more frequent. As things stand now, I’d probably fall somewhere in the middle: as China grows and her global reach expands, there are going to be any number of new friction points between China and the US, but I find it hard to imagine open conflict between the two states. Impossible? No. Improbable? Yes.
The notion that the adoption of democracy in China would entrench the peaceful rise and diffuse competitive tension is sometimes explicitly noted and other times implied, but it is a very real theme when the topic of China is broached. I find this to be incredibly irritating for several reasons. First, the possibility (and very real existence) of illiberal democratic regimes has been described in great detail by Fareed Zakaria and others. The idea of a China where national “free and fair” elections are held but citizens have little or no insight into the mechanisms of government and activities of the true powerful and thus are completely isolated from policymaking is not a stretch. In such a scenario, there would be little expectation for a change in behavior from China. Second, even with a reasonable level of democracy and liberalism in China, competition and even conflict with the US could still arise. Widespread Chinese nationalism or a simple dislike and resentment of the US might very well lead to an elected government more disposed towards conflict than the government currently in place in China. Nationalism has long been an important force in China, and its rapid economic and geopolitical rise has led to a resurgence of popular nationalistic pride. As Robert Kaplan, Zakaria, Amy Chua and others have argued, the period of democratic transition can be one of great political and economic upheaval and instability, a situation that could allow significant opportunities for nationalism to flourish, as occurred in several of the post-Soviet republics. A Chinese nationalism could potentially become even more entrenched in such a chaotic time, and certainly could prove an important rallying point for a bevy of new voters.
I suppose all of the above is a long way of saying “be careful what you wish for.” A democratic China may not prove to be the panacea that many in the US and Europe often seem to think.
* Which I am no more qualified to speak on than Tunisia and Egypt, but I will use it to discuss more general IR themes.