Introduction, and a response

I'd like to thank Stilicho for the chance to write here-- it's been a while since I've put my thoughts down, and I'm excited to be a part of the debate. I'm a youngster currently working at a defense contractor in Washington, DC. As a new cog in the military-industrial complex, I enjoy reflecting on the balance between maintaining my progressive values and understanding that all change is gradual. Is the principled view from the outside more ethical than the pragmatism it takes to effect real change? Does my compensation inherently lead towards a compromised worldview? What does it mean to call myself a 'liberal' as I take part in the greatest concentration of power in history and live in a sanitized bubble? I try to ask myself these kinds of questions when the conversation turns to drone strikes and troop levels.

I've been following this protracted debate at Ink Spots and elsewhere. On this blog, Stilicho convincingly argued that the 'grand enemy' is usually just a shortcut to a grand strategy, a shortcut that in the United States has become "a difficult thing to abandon." I'd go one step further and argue that the political structure of the United States precludes any kind of grand strategy but one focused on a grand enemy.

No matter how beautifully articulated, a grand strategy still needs to be implemented by individuals. Just as a sports team's manager needs to align a season's strategy with the aspirations of his players, a national leader must ensure that the interests of critical power brokers fall in line with the chosen grand strategy. In other words, individual incentives need to support the net effort.

Successful grand strategies include a domestic element part and parcel. Byzantium's themes relied on the ambitions of individual generals, and China's "harmonious world" line isn't much more than a caution against internal dissent. The character of the Spanish empire's growth stemmed directly from its religious and class identities, while North Korea controls its foreign policy by simply quashing all non-governmental actors. A grand strategy must reflect the realities of domestic decision-making as much as any foreign policy challenges.

The United States will never have a grand strategy without a grand enemy for the same reason we're stuck with a two-party system. In a political system that rewards binary policy positions, forces winner-takes-all politicking, and always carries the chance for a drastic change in leadership, there is simply no room for anything but the simplest, clearest, and most sloganistic grand strategy. There is hardly any mechanism within the USG that rewards the kind of subtle, long-term planning and execution required by all but the most elementary foreign policies. Can we develop outstanding bilateral relations through a tireless DoS? Sure. Do we develop and implement advanced, far-sighted military policies through the USD for Policy? Absolutely. But will we ever be able to form a meaningful grand strategy centered around anything but a clear and present danger, one so obvious that it rewards a Congressman at the ballot box? No way. That' s not how our democracy works.