I don't think anyone is surprised by the content of the President's Afghanistan-Pakistan
review set to be officially released tomorrow. Disrupting Al-Qa'ida remains the primary goal, Pakistan is still difficult and important, and a "responsible, conditions-based US troop reduction" is still on the books for July 2011. Not that
US troops or
US funds are truly going anywhere for a long time.
There is a
good article on NPR today about the pivot points in Afghanistan that don't seem to be covered in the report. The review maintains a predictable but regrettable silence on the corrupt and unreliable Afghan government, dedicates hardly a word about the
fragility of the Afghan National Army, avoids specifics about Pakistan (other than indicating how
dangerous and frustrating it remains), and fails to address the rise of Al-Qa'ida presence outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan as pressure on the organization increases on both sides of the border. But there was one part in particular that caught my eye:
3. NATO Commitment: At the organization's summit meeting last month, NATO allies agreed to Obama's call to maintain a large Western military presence in Afghanistan until 2014. Countries that were planning to pull out combat troops — notably, Canada — agreed to provide troops to help train the Afghan National Army. The administration's review summary highlights NATO's "enduring commitment beyond 2014," yet it's clear that European leaders face considerable political pressure back home to withdraw, and only Britain has a sizable number of troops on the ground. As a result, the war is becoming increasingly Americanized. On Thursday, Germany's foreign minister confirmed that country's intention to begin withdrawing its 4,600 troops from Afghanistan by the end of next year.
How long does the Alliance last when it proves incapable of succeeding in Afghanistan? It's pretty clear that, in general, Europe has little appetite for the mission, or for funding military establishments. Whether or not their societies have become "
debellicized," the Europeans in ISAF have been, aside from the British and the Dutch, constrained by iron rules of engagement and squirreled away in more "peaceful" parts of the country. European populations have been vocally against these contributions, despite the constraints designed to make them more palatable. It has been argued that even this meager European contribution has been about "
saving NATO" and keeping the US as guarantor of the collective security of a region currently slashing defense budgets in the midst of austerity.
With the Dutch--having been engaged heavily in volatile Uruzgan--already gone, the Canadians pulling out two-thirds of their troops--leaving about 1,000 trainers in country while removing "combat troops, the Germans beginning withdrawal by the end of 2011, and the Poles out by 2012, its beginning to look lonely for the US after 2011. The US isn't going anywhere in significant numbers until at least 2014, whatever the withdrawals that will occur around July 2011.
The US has its own troubles with a sluggish economy, bloated defense spending, and, let's face it, a near-paralyzing inability for domestic leaders to agree to do anything about, well, anything. NATO and US presence in Europe could become a popular target of outraged, cost-cutting politicians. After all, it could be argued the majority of NATO abandoned the US in Afghanistan and relies on massive US expenditures for defense even as they slash their domestic defense budgets. Coupled with the
hysteria about rising China and rivalry in the Pacific, and the foundational
weakness of "resurgent" Russia, we may very well be seeing the sunset of the grand old alliance. As a bit of an Atlanticist myself, an alumnus of Scotland's finest
university, and a believer in the success of a US security blanket that has allowed for, among other things, an ambitious political union of formerly conflict-ridden states and the
Eurovision Song Contest, I would be sorry to see it go.
